The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed a trial court that had refused to register and enforce a UK custody order in Georgia. The opinion outlines some of the arguments both parents made. The arguments, themselves, are quite confusing and miss the mark. The court distilled the case as a simple one under the UCCJEA, where a Georgia court shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of another state (and country) if the other state (or country) exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional principles. The registration process is fairly straight forward, and the non-registering party can contest the registration on only narrow grounds: the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under “Part 2 of the UCCJEA”; the order was vacated, stayed, or modified by the court having jurisdiction; or there was no notice.
In this particular case, the Mother and Child left the UK and returned to Georgia in March 2017. Mere days later, the Reading County Court in London issued a court order related to the child, setting forth obligations as to custody, and the mother’s obligation to return the child. Two days later, the father sought to have this UK custody order domesticated in Georgia, and the mother agreed to its domestication. The mother then sought permission from the UK court to permanently relocate the child to the USA. On April 18, 2019, the UK family court signed a subsequent court order that permitted the child’s relocation until June 22, 2021, and provided for access between child and father. But, four months before the UK family court issued its subsequent court order, the mother filed a complaint for divorce and primary custody in Georgia. In that complaint, she stated that there were no foreign orders concerning the child that had been registered or confirmed in Georgia. Setting aside the 2017 UK order’s domestication in Georgia, the UK court had not yet issued its 2019 order, so it had not been registered in Georgia, yet. The father ultimately sought to register it in September 2020. Aside from whether the UK order should be registered or not is the unanswered question as to whether Georgia even has jurisdiction to issue a child custody order. Pursuant to the UCCJEA, the UK would presumably have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, unless and until it declines jurisdiction in lieu of Georgia as a more convenient forum.
When the father filed to register the 2019 UK order, he apparently made some assertions that are confusing, and unnecessary to the analysis. For instance, he stated that Georgia is the child’s home state – this is not a prerequisite for registering an order under the UCCJEA. He also stated that the “parties are subject to the 1996 Convention between the United States and Great Britain that determines which state has jurisdiction regarding child custody…” But, this is incorrect. The U.S. signed the 1996 Convention in 2010 (which does dictate custody jurisdiction), but has not ratified the treaty, so it is not in place between the U.S. and any other Contracting State. The mother sought to fight registration alleging that the foreign decree is contrary to public policy “given the father’s conduct and the best interest of the child,” but, as noted above, this is actually not an allowable argument to avoid registering the foreign order. Ultimately, the appellate court determined that the Mother did not meet any of her burden for actually contesting registration, so the 2019 UK order shall be registered.
